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The central hypothesis of this article is that there are a large number of terrorist groups whichprolifically employ strategic communication (stratcom), while paradoxically, there are others who markedlyunder utilize it, and therefore, fail to mobilize support for the professed cause. The decisive determinant for either of the two ends, it is argued, obtains in the intellectual endowment or its banality among the conspiratorial groupings. A case of stratcom by two leading Pakistani Taliban groups– Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and TTP– Jammat ul Ahrar– is systematically investigated. The analysis clearly engenders that these terrorist organizations are com munication un-savvy, because, they are not only religiously and secularly less informed and increasingly rhetorical but are intellec tually far less creative to articulate a people inspired rhetorical vision. The brutalization of the civilians further trivializes their discourses. Theyhavethuslargelyfailedtoevokemeaningfulsocialmobilization. Besides further elaborating on the findings,theconclusion reflects on a few limitations of the research, offers input for broadening the research scope of some of the key dimensions of terrorism literature and ends with the discussion on some policy implications